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WHEN SHOULD IGNORANCE TRUMP THE CONSTITUTION?
ANOTHER DISSENT FROM HERRICK II
HERBERT L. MESCHKE*
"To write clearly and to speak clearly, you first must think clearly."
Appellate Practice Tip of the Week, North Dakota Supreme Court Home Page, **
Tuesday, January 12, 1999 (quoting Elmer Lower, former president, ABC News).
I. WHEN IS OFFICIAL RELIANCE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE?
This writer was a member of the North Dakota Supreme Court when
it first heard and decided State v. Herrickl (hereinafter "Herrick I") in
1997. I was also on the Court when State v. Herrick2 (hereinafter "Her-
rick 11") was argued in 1998, but I retired on October 1, 1998, without
accepting a surrogate judgeship. Therefore, I did not participate in the
split decision in Herrick II. I write to agree with the Herrick II dissent by
Justice Mary Muehlen Maring, endorse her clearly written analysis, and
propose additional reasons why the Herrick 11 majority opinion was
wrong.
In her dissent, Justice Maring clearly marshaled the reasons why
there should not be a good faith exception to the exclusionary remedy
under North Dakota Constitution Article I, Section 8, which prohibits un-
reasonable searches. 3 Her opinion was well "based on a thorough and
considered analysis of North Dakota history, the origin of the right, our
own precedent, related case law from other jurisdictions, subsequent legis-
lation, and the purposes of Article I, Section 8 our court has recog-
nized." 4 There is nothing I would add to that particular constitutional
analysis.
The majority, on the other hand, disclaimed any intent to decide, as
Justice Maring would, whether "North Dakota does provide greater state
constitutional protections than the Fourth Amendment" and, if so,
"whether such heightened protection would preclude a good faith ex-
ception to North Dakota's exclusionary rule." 5 Thus, Justice Maring's
thoughtful analysis may yet be a defining one for heightened state
* Retired Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court (1985-1998); now Of Counsel to Pringle &
Herigstad, P.C., Minot, N.D.
** <http://www.court.state.nd.us/>.
1. 1997 N.D. 155, 567 N.W.2d 336.
2. 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847.
3. See State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, H][ 41-54, 588 N.w.2d at 847, 854-57 (Herrick 11).
4. Id. 1 55, 588 N.W.2d at 857.
5. Id. 1 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
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protections for the constitutional right of privacy expressed in this state's
independently developed prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Still, Justice Maring spoke more clearly about the majority's awk-
ward reasoning than did the majority itself. She explained the majority
"reasons that, because the exclusionary rule in our state has its genesis
from federal constitutional doctrine, we 'must' follow United States v.
Leon6 and adopt a good faith exception." 7 She pointed out the majority
"determine[d] the good faith exception applie[d] . . . and conclude[d] .
. . the 'officers acted in objective reasonable reliance on the no-knock
warrant.'"8 While Justice Maring did not agree or disagree with the
majority's conclusion that the officers "acted in objective reasonable
reliance," she accurately commented on the harsh irony in the majority
interpreting a statute that "actually provides greater protection to our
citizens from no-knock warrants than the federal constitution in a way
that arguably weakens this protection." 9
In this unofficial dissent, I seek to reinforce Justice Maring's
position by analyzing one of the majority's conclusions not addressed
by her dissent: Whether the officers fairly could be said to have acted in
objective reliance on a perception of a blanket rule that justified a valid
no-knock warrant in every drug case. In my opinion, because clear
federal precedent for this state had already clarified that the presence of
drugs alone did not supply valid constitutional grounds for a no-knock
warrant, the officers' reliance in Herrick could not have been objectively
reasonable.
II. THE HERRICK CASE CONTEXT
Police searched garbage in an alley behind Curtis Herrick's home
twice, in February 1995 and January 1996. Each time they found a few
pieces of marijuana and a wire or two with drug residues. In the second
search, officers also found notes on growing marijuana and a torn check
with Herrick's name on it.10 With this evidence, the officers obtained a
no-knock search warrant for Herrick's home. In the search, the officers
found marijuana and drug paraphernalia."1 They charged Herrick with
6. 468 U.S. 877 (1984).
7. Herrick 1, 41, 588 N.W.2d at 854.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. H' 2-3, 588 N.W.2d at 848.
11. Id. 14.
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drug possession, possession with intent to deliver, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. 12
Herrick moved to suppress the evidence from the search of his
home, arguing the no-knock feature of the search warrant violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to protection from unreasonable
searches. 13  When the trial court refused suppression, Herrick pled
conditionally guilty to preserve the suppression question for appellate
review. 14
In 1997, the North Dakota Supreme Court provisionally reversed
Herrick's conviction. 15 The Court concluded the issuing magistrate was
neutral and detached and there had been probable cause for a search of
Herrick's home. 16 Herrick I held, however, that North Dakota Century
Code section 19-03.1-32(3) required a separate showing of probable
cause for a no-knock entry, which had not been shown. 17 The presence
of drugs, without more, did not constitutionally permit a no-knock en-
try.' 8 Rather than reverse Herrick's conviction outright, however, the
Court remanded for the trial court to consider whether a good faith
exception to the exclusionary remedy should apply and, for any further
appeal, specifically directed the parties to "brief the question of whether
[the Court] should recognize a good-faith exception, and if so, whether it
should be applied" to Herrick.19
On remand, the trial court applied the good faith exception first
formulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Leon. 20 The trial court reasoned the North Dakota Supreme Court
would adopt that exception, found the applicant-officer had "acted in
good faith when she obtained and executed the search warrant because at
the time . . . it was legal in North Dakota to issue no-knock search
warrants in all cases w[h]ere drugs are involved," and concluded the affi-
davit by the officer was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable."21 The trial
court therefore reinstated Herrick's conviction, and Herrick appealed. 22
On appeal, Herrick mainly argued that the North Dakota Constitu-
tion, in Article I, Section 8, gives greater protection against unreasonable
12. Id.
13. Id.15.
14. Id.
15. State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, 1 28, 567 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Herrick 1).
16. Id. (K 11, 15, 567 N.W.2d at 340-41.
17. Id. 1 23, 567 N.W.2d at 343.
18. Id. 1 21, 567 N.W.2d at 342.
19. Id. 1 27, 567 N.W.2d at 344.
20. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
21. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 7, 588 N.W.2d 847, at 848-49 (Herrick If).
22. Id.
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searches than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23
Herrick also argued, if the good faith exception to the exclusionary
remedy was available to law officers in North Dakota, it was wrongly
applied to him. He insisted "the affidavit and application for the
no-knock warrant [were] so lacking of indicia of probable cause and
specificity that a reasonable person could not believe the warrant was
valid," one of the four categorical circumstances for exclusion of
evidence that Leon 24 held unaffected by the good faith exception. 25
III. THE HERRICK II MAJORITY'S REASONING
The majority reasoned that the North Dakota legislature enacted
North Dakota Century Code section 19-03.1-32(3) to afford greater
protection for a no-knock entry than the Fourth Amendment did by
requiring an officer to show knocking and announcing would probably
cause destruction of evidence or endanger the entering officers.2 6 The
majority compared North Dakota's statutory requirement to the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Richards v. Wisconsin,27 which
established that the Fourth Amendment required only a reasonable
suspicion, not probable cause, before officers can enter without
knocking and announcing. 28 The majority nevertheless concluded that
"when a violation of N.D.C.C. [section] 19- 03.1-32(3) is so closely
associated with Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, rights, it is
23. Id. 1 21, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
24. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
25. Herrick If, 16, 588 N.W.2d at 850.
26. Id. 8, 588 N.W.2d at 849. The statute reads:
Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant, without notice of the officer's
authority and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building,
or any part of the building, or anything therein, if the judge or magistrate issuing the war-
rant has probable cause to believe that if such notice were to be given the property
sought in the case may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to
the life or limb of the officer or another may result, and has included in the warrant a
direction that the officer executing it is not required to give such notice. Any officers act-
ing under such warrant, as soon as practicable after entering the premises, shall identify
themselves and state the purpose of entering the premises and the authority for doing so.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1997) (emphasis added).
27. 520 U.S. 385 (1997). In Richards, the Supreme Court reversed a Wisconsin Supreme Court
ruling that no-knock warrants are per se reasonable where the search is for drugs or evidence of
drug-related activity. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997).
28. Herrick II, 9, 588 N.W.2d at 849. The distinction, if any, between a reasonable suspicion
and probable cause is difficult to express and may be more metaphysical than real. Each is a prelimi-
nary standard of evidence needed to justify official action to seize someone or to search someone's
property. The difference between them, if any, would take up more space and time to study than is
available in this essay. Anyway, it may be doubtful whether Richards v. Wisconsin intended to change
the probable cause standard to authorize a warrant for a no-knock entry, as differentiated from the
customary standard of reasonable suspicion for "the officers' authority to exercise independent judg-
ment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed," that
Richards apparently applied in its part Ill. Richards, 520 U.S. at 388.
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appropriate, and arguably necessary for us to consider similar remedies
for this statutory violation as granted for constitutional violations." 29
However, having recognized that it was "arguably necessary" to ex-
clude evidence obtained in violation of the statute on no-knock drug war-
rants, the majority abruptly dismissed that remedy because "the source
of the exclusionary remedy in this state is the Fourth Amendment." 30
Since State v. Manning31 held that "the state rule ... allowing illegally
obtained evidence at trial ha[d] been overruled by Mapp v. Ohio," 32 the
majority concluded it "must . . . consider the application of the good
faith exception delineated in" Leon. 33 The Herrick II majority thus
mainly confined its remaining analysis to Leon as the controlling federal
Fourth Amendment doctrine for applying the exclusionary remedy and
the good faith exception.
Later in the opinion, the majority returned to the protection against
unreasonable searches in Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota
constitution. 34 However, the majority avoided addressing Herrick's
major argument that the state constitution provides greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment. 35 The majority simply declared that "we
need not decide today the question of whether North Dakota's
Constitution may indeed provide greater protections than the United
States Constitution" because the "issue . . . in this case is a violation of a
statute ... and not a violation of Article I, Section 8" of the state consti-
tution. 36 The majority did not explain why they concluded the state
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches could not apply
to Herrick. Rather, the majority simply closed their minds to an
argument plainly made.
The majority's devaluation of a state statute implementing a state
constitutional protection was surprising, unprecedented, and virtually
unexplained. 37 The majority thus left a hole in Herrick H's reasoning.
Later, I will say more about gaps in the majority opinion's reasoning.
Herrick also made a related argument for suppression, citing Leon's
third category of instances in which suppression is unaffected by the
good faith rule.38 Under this category, suppression remains appropriate
29. Id. 1 10.
30. Id. 112.
31. 134 N.W.2d 91, 98 (N.D. 1965).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Herrick 11, 12, 588 NW.2d at 849.
34. See id. 123-27, 588 N.W.2d at 851-52.
35. Id. 1 27, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
36. Id. It 26-27.
37. Cf. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1985) (recognizing that statutes guarding right to
counsel implement state constitutional guarantee).
38. Herrick I, 16, 588 N.W.2d at 850.
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when "the affidavit and application for the no-knock warrant in this case
were so lacking in indicia of probable cause . . that a reasonable person
could not believe the warrant was valid." 39 The majority concluded that
two prior state precedents, State v. Loucks40 and State v. Knudson,41
supplied "the officers here . . . indicia of probable cause . . . to seek a
no-knock search warrant":
Law enforcement in North Dakota generally, and specifically
in this case, operated under the belief that if drugs were present
a no-knock warrant was justifiably obtainable. This belief was
directly traceable to our prior rulings in cases like Loucks and
Knudson in which we took judicial notice .. .that drugs were
easily disposed of.42
The majority then concluded, "under federal precedent," that it must
hold "the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule ... appl[ied] to
a no-knock warrant issued on a per se basis by a judge or magistrate
under N.D.C.C. [section] 19-03.1-32(3)."43 The majority used United
States v. Moore44 for this conclusion. 45 It correctly recognized that
Moore applied the good faith exception in a federal prosecution after a
Nebraska state judge had issued an invalid no-knock warrant under an
impermissible blanket rule allowing no-knock entries in all drug
searches.46
However, this phase of the majority's holding left several other
things unnoticed and unsaid (more "gaps") and overlooked the real
effect of the holding in Moore (a "glitch"). For all courts in the Eighth
Circuit, Moore made clear a blanket rule for drug cases could not there-
after reasonably be used to obtain a no-knock search warrant. 47 This
article suggests that glitch and the other gaps in Herrick IH make it
questionable precedent for any purpose.
IV. WHAT IS "OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE GOOD FAITH"?
The Herrick II majority correctly summarized Leon, the landmark
case that established a good faith exception to the exclusionary remedy
39. Id.
40. 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973).
41. 499 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1993).
42. Herrick II, 20, 588 N.W.2d at 850-51 (citing State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (1973) and
State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872 (1993)).
43. Id.
44. 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8th Cir. 1992).
45. Herrick H1, 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851 (citing United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
46. Id.
47. See Moore, 956 F.2d at 850 (referring to such a blanket rule as "patently unjustifiable").
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for Fourth Amendment violations. In doing so, the majority quoted
Justice Blackmun's Leon concurrence: "Evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable
reliance on a search warrant . . . need not be excluded, as a matter of
federal law, from the case in chief of federal and state criminal
prosecutions." 48 Leon, however, also recognized that an officer may not
always rely on a facially valid warrant and that suppression remains the
remedy in some situations when a warrant is invalid.49 Among the four
situations where police cannot reasonably rely on a warrant, Leon
describes the third to be when the warrant was based on an affidavit "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable." 50
So, what distinguishes an "entirely unreasonable belief' from "ob-
jectively reasonable reliance"? In other words, the question must be:
When is official ignorance of the law reasonable enough to justify over-
riding a citizen's constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures?
The United States Supreme Court has given us scant guidance on
when official ignorance can be reasonable. However, we have enough
guidance to conclude the Herrick H officers could not have reasonably
relied on the Loucks and Knudson precedents because there had been
clear judicial warnings those precedents were no longer the law.
In Leon, the trial court and the court of appeals had held the offi-
cer's affidavit for the warrant did not show probable cause to search
three separate residences, including Leon's, because the informant's
knowledge of criminal activity was stale and the affidavit had insufficient
information about the informant's credibility. 51 Probable cause was
neither briefed nor argued to the Leon Court.52 Leon pointed out, but
disregarded as "speculative," that:
One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the
warrant application deters future inadequate presentations or
"magistrate shopping" and thus promote the ends of the
Fourth Amendment. 53
48. Herrick II, 1 14, 588 N.W.2d at 850 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927
(1984)).
49. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 903.
52. Id. at 905.
53. Id. at 918.
1999]
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Thus, under Leon, a warrant based on an officer's affidavit, which in turn
is based on stale and unreliable information, may be "objectively
reasonable."54
Since Leon, the United States Supreme Court has spoken only twice
more on the good faith exception. In Illinois v. Krull,55 a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court held the good faith doctrine permitted use
of evidence obtained by an officer without a warrant in objectively
reasonable reliance on a statute later declared unconstitutional. 56  In
Krull, the Court noted its prior cases had observed "evidence should be
suppressed 'only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search
was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."' 57 Later in Krull,
the Court explained: "Nor can a law enforcement officer be said to
have acted in good faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such
that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was
unconstitutional." 58 The Court supported this assertion by quoting
from its civil liability decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald59:
[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have
known. 60
Thus, when rights are "clearly established" by statute or case law, an
officer cannot reasonably rely on a contradictory warrant.
In a dissent for four members of the Court, Justice O'Connor
helped explain the effect of the majority opinion by pointing out that
"[t]he scope of the Court's good faith exception is unclear." 6 1 She
added: "I think the Court errs in importing Harlow's 'clearly es-
tablished law' test into this area, because it is not apparent how much
constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to know." 62 Justice
O'Connor explained also that for the case of a facially valid warrant, as
in Leon, "Courts need not inquire into the officer's probable understand-
54. See id. at 925-26.
55. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
56. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-53 (1987) (applying Leon good faith exception to subse-
quently invalidated statute).
57. Id. at 348-49 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 355.
59. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
60. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
61. Id. at 366.
62. Id. at 367.
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ing of the state of the law except in the extreme instance of a search
warrant upon which no reasonable officer would rely." 63
Later, in Arizona v. Evans,6 4 the Supreme Court held the good faith
of officers enabled admission of evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution when erroneous information in the affidavit resulted from
clerical errors by court employees and the affiant-officer did not know
about the error.65
Lack of knowledge defines ignorance. Thus, an ignorant and unin-
formed officer can search for evidence, unreasonably and unconstitu-
tionally but without consequences, according to Leon, Krull, and Evans.
What ignorance should override a remedy for constitutional violations?
What ignorance should trump constitutional rights?66 Krull told us, at
the very least, an official cannot ignore "clearly established" law.67
V. THE GAPS IN HERRICK II
In rejecting Herrick's argument that a reasonable person could not
have believed the warrant to search his home was valid, the Herrick II ma-
jority concluded the searching officers "operated under the belief that if
drugs were present a no-knock warrant was justifiably obtainable," and
their "belief was directly traceable to our prior rulings in cases like
Loucks and Knudson [that] took judicial notice that drugs were easily
disposed of."68 This conclusion, however, omitted any consideration, or
even mention, of Herrick's clear argument, citing three prior opinions of
the North Dakota Supreme Court that each suppressed evidence resulting
from an invalid search warrant when the officer's reliance on a deter-
mination of probable cause was objectively unreasonable. 69
63. Id.
64. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
65. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995).
66. Usually, ignorance of the law does not excuse a citizen. See State v. Sundquist, 542 N.W.2d
90, 91 (N.D. 1996) ("It is a well-established concept that everyone 'is charged with knowledge of the
provisions of statutes and must take notice thereof."') (quoting Lumkin v. Streifel, 308 N.W.2d 878,
880 (N.D. 1981)); Berg v. Hogan, 322 N.W.2d 448, 452 (N.D. 1982); State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d
899, 905-06 (N.D. 1978); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 88 N.W.2d 104, 107 (N.D. 1958); State v.
Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D. 1955) ("[I]t is a well-established rule that ignorance of the law
excuses no one .... ); Regional Agricultural Credit Corp. v. Stewart, 289 N.W. 801, 804 (N.D. 1940);
In re Voss, 90 N.W. 15, 21 (N.D. 1902) ("Neither his ignorance of the laws, nor the crudity of his
notions of professional ethics, can excuse an offense against professional propriety by one whose duty
it is to assist in the administration of justice."); State ex rel. Sheeks v. Hilliard, 87 N.W. 980, 982 (N.D.
1901) ("Her ignorance of the law presents no excuse which can be recognized as valid."). Should
there be a double-standard: Ignorance cannot excuse a citizen, but it will excuse an official's conduct
that violates a citizen's constitutional right to privacy?
67. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
68. Herrick 11, 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
69. See State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1995) (concluding that "the implication of criminal
activity in this case is simply too weak and tenuous to make it objectively reasonable for the officers to
rely on the warrant"); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 785 (N.D. 1985) (rejecting application of
1999] 755
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Herrick's attorney argued the application for the warrant in this
case contained nothing but conclusory and tenuous suggestions of need
for a no-knock entry. 70  His argument pointed out the application
contained no reference to concerns for officer safety or easily disposable
evidence, two justifications for no-knock warrants in North Dakota.71
Herrick's attorney also argued the officers lacked training and experi-
ence in drug-related matters, thus precluding a conclusion they acted in
good faith.72
When appellate counsel has marshaled firepower for an apt argu-
ment, as Herrick's did here, the Court ought to deal with it directly, face
the supporting cases cited, and not sidestep the subject. The majority's
failure to do so here was a gap in its Herrick II opinion that may have
contributed to its major glitch.
Traditionally, "every point fairly arising upon the record of the
case shall be considered and decided, and the reasons therefor shall be
concisely state in writing, signed by the judges concurring." 73 Current-
ly, the North Dakota Constitution, Article VI, section 5, says, "When a
judgment or order is reversed, modified, or confirmed by the supreme
court, the reasons shall be concisely stated in writing, signed by the
justices concurring." I submit "reasons ...concisely stated" should
still cover "every point fairly arising upon the record."
It is understandable why the Court does not address arguments not
made, poorly made, or poorly supported, but it is difficult to understand
why the majority failed to address or discuss an explicit argument made
and clearly supported with the Court's own precedents. It is particularly
difficult to understand here, because the majority made clear that "both
parties submitted well-developed arguments and briefs on the reasons for
and against applying a good-faith exception to the exclusionary remedy
in this case." 74 The failure to address directly one of Herrick's main
arguments left a large gap in the majority opinion.
good faith exception to suppression because the officers' conduct was not objectively reasonable
when "veteran officers, aware of the availability of no-knock warrants ... and without belief there
were exigent circumstances, entered through the open main door without knocking or ringing the
doorbell."); State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 (N.D. 1985) (concluding that the officer's
affidavit had nothing but "a most tenuous and conclusory suggestion that the Thompsons were involved
in criminal activity" at their home).
70. See Brief of Appellant at 7-13, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847 (Nos. 980082-
980084).
71. See id. at 9-10.
72. See id. at 8-9, 12.
73. Former section 101 of the 1889 North Dakota Constitution, repealed by art. amend. 97,
approved Sept. 7, 1976 (1975 N.D. Laws, ch. 615, § 2; 1977 N.D. Laws, ch. 599).
74. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 13, 588 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Herrick I1).
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VI. A MAJOR GLITCH: MISREADING MOORE
However, there was also another glitch here. The majority conclud-
ed the officers in this case "operated under the belief that if drugs were
present a no-knock warrant was justifiably obtainable" because older
rulings of the North Dakota Supreme Court had been read to say that.
The majority interpreted Loucks and Knudson as supplying "indicia of
probable cause" that made the officers' reliance on the warrant objec-
tively reasonable. 75 Indeed, the discussion in Herrick I, declaring uncon-
stitutional a blanket rule that justified issuance of a no-knock warrant on
the presence of drugs alone, seemed to imply a change in constitutional
doctrine. The change was not new or sudden. Moore and Knudson had
already published the change; Herrick I simply republished it.
Even before Herrick I, the Eight Circuit had "clearly established"
the federal law for North Dakota when it ruled in 1992 that "a blanket
rule permitting no-knock search warrants in all drug cases, regardless of
whether the forms and quantities suspected to be present can be readily
destroyed, is patently unjustifiable." 76 The Eighth Circuit's geographi-
cal federal jurisdiction includes North Dakota.77 After the Moore pro-
nouncement, the federal constitutional law for North Dakota was clearly
established: no more automatic no-knock warrants in drug cases. 78 The
Herrick I majority missed the plain meaning of Moore.
The majority cited Moore for applying the good faith exception
to the exclusionary remedy when a no-knock warrant had been issued
"on a per se basis," because the majority was deciding "under federal
precedent." 79 For that purpose, however, the majority missed the key
sentence in Moore's reasoning: "There were no Supreme Court or
Eighth Circuit precedents that should have warned [the officer] that his
affidavit was obviously inadequate under the Fourth Amendment." 8 0
By the time of the warrant in Herrick's case, there was an Eighth Circuit
precedent that clearly warned the officer that her affidavit "was obvi-
75. Id. 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
76. United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 1992).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
78. Moore, 956 F.2d at 850-51.
79. Herrick I!, 20, 588 N.W.2d at 851.
80. Moore, 956 F.2d at 851. Perhaps the majority was misled because Herrick's appellate brief
did not cite or discuss Moore. See Brief of Appellant at ii, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d
847 (Nos. 980082-980084). However, the prosecution's brief quoted this very sentence, loud and
clear. See Brief of Appellee at 22, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847 (Nos. 980082-
980084).
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ously inadequate under the Fourth Amendment." 81 Moore broadcast
that warning.82
The Herrick II majority thus overlooked the importance of an
Eighth Circuit precedent for federal law in North Dakota.83 Both state
courts and the federal courts of appeal must obey the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, Art. VI: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." 84
Moreover, Moore specifically dealt with North Dakota's older
precedent. The Herrick II majority did not notice that the Loucks case
had been explicitly mentioned by Moore85 to show North Dakota was
one of a minority of six states "upholding a blanket rule," a rule that
Moore condemned as "patently unjustifiable." 86
So, any North Dakota lawyer or judge who did customary "home-
work" by citating Loucks would have discovered Moore. A reading of
Moore would have made it clear that a "blanket" or "per se" rule no
longer fit federal doctrine. It is difficult to imagine how there could be
any "objective reasonableness" in relying on a "blanket" rule already
condemned by a published Eighth Circuit precedent.
Under Leon and Krull, ignorance of clear precedent can hardly be
objectively reasonable for either judges or officers. The Herrick H
majority's conclusion the officers acted reasonably was thus wrong, in
the light of the clearly established federal precedent for North Dakota.
81. See Moore, 956 F.2d at 851.
82. See id. at 850-51.
83. See McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1982):
We are mindful that the federal judiciary is supreme in exposition of the law of the
United States Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Sommers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (Michigan Supreme Court reversed on federal constitu-
tional grounds); Cooper v. Avery, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). We therefore make no attempt
to arrive at our own independent interpretation of the United States Constitution, but
follow the federal decisions as we understand them.
Id.; see also Fox v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("Because
this court is construing a federal statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the
federal courts interpreting that statute are binding"); St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 118, 122 (S.D.
1994). Cf. Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1991) ("In passing on federal constitutional
questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the
same position; there is a parallelism but not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the
same reviewing authority of the Supreme Court").
84. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
85. Moore, 956 F.2d at 850 n.9.
86. Id. at 850.
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VII. ANOTHER GLITCH: MISREADING KNUDSON
The majority's narrow reading of Knudson87 is also remarkable in
the light of the prior Moore decision. The Court in Knudson applied
Loucks' blanket rule "because we have taken judicial notice" that drugs
are "typically easily disposable evidence" in the past. 88 However, when
the magistrate issued the Knudson search warrant, Moore had barely
been decided and had not yet been published. 89 Thus, it was reasonable
in Knudson, as in Moore, to conclude that there "were no Supreme
Court or Eighth Circuit precedents that should have warned [the Knud-
son officer] that his affidavit was obviously inadequate under the Fourth
Amendment." 90
Moore was decided on February 12, 1992.91 The no-knock warrant
in Knudson was issued by a North Dakota magistrate on February 29,
1992, barely two weeks after the Moore decision was announced and
before it could be generally known. 92 Rather than reading Knudson as
continuing a blanket rule, the Herrick II majority should have under-
stood Knudson as the last appearance of an unsound rule in North
Dakota. After Knudson pointedly called North Dakota practitioners'
attention to Moore's holding that the blanket rule was "patently unjusti-
fiable," 93 prosecutors and police officers should no longer have been
able to rely reasonably on a blanket rule to obtain a no-knock warrant in
drug cases.
Justice Levine's 1993 opinion for the Court in Knudson not only
cited Moore but also quoted its clear warning that "a blanket rule . . is
patently unjustifiable." 94 Soon after that, Professor Thomas M. Lock-
ney discussed and quoted the cautionary Knudson footnote about Moore
in an article published for the North Dakota legal community. 95 After
1992, how could a North Dakota prosecutor argue with a straight face
that law enforcement officials were reasonably ignorant of the correct
87. State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1993).
88. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. I, 17, 588 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Herrick I1) (quoting Knudson, 499
N.W.2d at 876).
89. Moore was decided February 12, 1992. Moore, 956 F.2d at 843. The warrant in Knudson
was issued February 29, 1992. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 873.
90. Moore, 956 F.2d at 851.
91. Id. at 843.
92. See Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 873.
93. See id. at 875 n.2.
94. Id.
95. See Thomas M. Lockney, Probable Cause for Nighttime, No-Knock Drug Searches: The Illu-
sion of Judicial Control in North Dakota, 69 N.D. L. REV. 613, 620-21 (1993).
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rule of law for obtaining a no-knock warrant to search for drugs? Yet
one did, and the Herrick I majority let him get away with it.96
VIII. CONCLUSION
This essay submits there were more reasons to reverse and to
suppress in Herrick H than given in Justice Maring's dissent. Despite the
North Dakota Supreme Court's older mistaken precedents, the Herrick II
officer's ignorance of the need to develop specific facts to show proba-
ble cause for a no-knock entry could not have been objectively reason-
able in light of "clearly established" federal law known, published, and
applicable in North Dakota.
With its gaps and glitches, in my "dissenting" view, Herrick II is
questionable precedent for any purpose, except for Justice Maring's
thoughtful thesis: North Dakota's independently developed prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures should be interpreted to afford
our citizens heightened protection for their right to privacy. 97
96. Again, Herrick did not cite or discuss Knudson in his appellate brief, but the prosecution did.
See Brief of Appellee at 25, State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847 (Nos. 980082-980084).
97. Unfortunately, the North Dakota Supreme Court quickly relied on Herrick II as controlling
precedent. See State v. VanBeek, 1999 N.D. 53, 26, 591 N.W.2d 112; State v. Hughes, 1999 N.D.
24, 1 8, 589 N.W.2d 912.
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